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THE COMPREHENSIVE CHILD CUSTODY
EVALUATION-TEN YEARS LATER
Robert L. Halon, Ph.D.*
1. INTRODUCTION ANDINTENT
"[lit has become clear that the number of licensing and ethics complaints
arising from psychologists performing child custody evaluations is quickly
rising. '
Complaints was one of two central issues with which "The
Comprehensive Child Custody Evaluation" concerned itself. "Quickly
rising," like "overnight success," is a presence finally too prevalent to
miss. The second issue, inseparably related to the first, was about the
need for clinicians to return to their scientific roots when accepting
status as "experts." The strategies offered ten years ago for conducting
child custody evaluations were formed in recognition of the immutable
distinction between science, on the one side, and the law and parenting,
on the other.2 The distinction and the dangers have been steadily
emphasized by experience over those ten years and by the cumulative
results of three lines of research begun almost fifty years ago: elements
of therapeutic efficacy; relative accuracies of clinical versus actuarial
methods of predicting; and "clinicians' judgments." Hence, being
scientific as opposed to clinical when serving as an "expert" in courts of
law is the most formidable ally an evaluator has when faced with the
onslaught of client discontent.
The current essay is intended to do four things: (1) explain how the
job descriptions and obligations of "clinicians" are significantly altered
by their accepting status as "expert" witnesses serving courts of law; (2)
describe the philosophical and practical distinctions between science,
* Dr. Halon received his doctorate from the University of California, Los
Angeles, where he also taught graduate classes. He taught undergraduates at California
State University, Los Angeles, and at California Polytechnic University, San Luis
Obispo. He is a Diplomat in the American Board of Professional Disability
Consultants and a Fellow in the American College of Forensic Psychology and the
Professional Academy of Custody Evaluators. Dr. Halon has published on issues of
child custody, personal injury, and the law and clemency. He is a past oral
commissioner of the California Board of Psychology. For the past twenty-five years
he has maintained a full-time private practice and in the past fifteen years increasingly
in forensic work.
1. S. Margaret Lee, Complaints in Child Custody Cases, 31 THE CAL. PSYCHOLOGIST,
Dec. 1998, at 24.
2. See Robert L. Halon, The Comprehensive Child Custody Evaluation, 8 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 19 (1999).
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the law, and parenting, and the significance of those differences; (3)
show how (1) and (2) are related; and (4) offer refinements to sugges-
tions offered ten years ago for how clinicians might best be scientific in
their work as child custody experts.
II. JOB DESCRIPTIONS: CLINICAL OPINION VERSUS EXPERT TESTIMONY
By the beginning of the 1950s, researchers, especially Eysenck,
were directly questioning the efficacy of professional counseling and
psychotherapy. In 1967, Carkuff and Berenson summarized the results
of such research by saying "troubled people, both children and adults,
are as likely to be rehabilitated if they are left alone as if they are treated
in professional counseling and psychotherapy," and "[w]hen we look at
the data, we find that counseling and psychotherapy can have construc-
tive or deteriorative consequences for clients, and these changes can be
accounted for by the level of the therapist's functioning on facilitative
dimensions, and independently of the therapist's orientation."3 While
Eysenck focused on showing that professional counseling and psycho-
therapy were not what many touted them to be, Rogers began looking
closely at what exactly might be their core curative elements.4 Learning
what might be that core remained the focus of research throughout the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s.' As a result of that research, the way clinicians
served their clients was fundamentally changed. The gist is this:
therapy is more likely to be efficacious when clinicians pay empathic
attention to the subjectivity of their clients while maintaining "uncondi-
tional positive regard" toward them. The more empathic, the least likely
therapists will be judgmental, and the more likely clients will, in a
sense, rehabilitate themselves and learn to be their own therapists in the
future. "Patients" are now considered "clients" who are brought in on
virtually all aspects of the therapy. They actively participate in the
development of intervention strategies, form therapeutic alliances with
the therapist, and become their own monitors, asked directly for
feedback about how well the therapy seems to be working.
Highly pertinent to this current essay, and to the distinction
between "clinical" and "forensic" practices, clients in therapy have on-
going, unending opportunities to decide for themselves whether to
3. ROBERT R. CARKHUFF & BERNARD G. BERENSON, BEYOND COUNSELING AND
THERAPY 13 (1967). See also BERNARD G. BERENSON & ROBERT R. CARKHUFF, SOURCES
OF GAIN IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1967).
4. See CARL R. ROGERS, CLENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951).
5. See MORTON LIEBERMAN ET AL., ENCOUNTER GROUPS: FIRST FACTS (1973).
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change therapists, things about the therapy, their relationships, and
themselves. In the therapeutic environment changes can be made
moment-to-moment, no one necessarily saddled with anything; not with
diagnosis, not with treatment plans, and not with clinicians' opinions,
to which clients are encouraged to freely respond with their own. In
stark contrast, not only are decisions in the forensic arena made for
persons but, once made, leave virtually no opportunity for meaningful
feedback nor alteration. The diagnosis, so to speak, is almost always the
final decision. Persons before the courts, and all those having signifi-
cant relationships to them, can be permanently effected by forces that
are essentially completely out of their control. Psychotherapy today is
essentially a moment-to-moment dialogue between clinicians and clients
who often relate person-to-person. In contrast, testimony in court is
never a dialogue, and the opinions rendered by "experts" in that arena
have a decided probability of being conclusory whether or not they were
intended to be.
When Meehl examined the accuracies of diagnoses made by
"clinical judgment" versus those made using the "Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory," he gave birth in psychology to a
second line of significant research, which eventually led to the broader
debate concerning the relative predictive accuracies of "judgment"
versus "actuarial methods."6 A steady stream of research since has
repeatedly demonstrated that "clinical judgment" is, at best, only 60%
accurate. That level of inaccuracy is acceptable in the therapy office
because no one is ever entirely saddled with the errors. In courts of law,
however, such error rates are acceptable only when expert testimony
directly acknowledges them and alerts triers of fact to the potential for
the expert having made such errors in the case at hand.' The conclusion
of that research seems indisputable: actuarial methods, upon which the
MMPI and the bulk of scientific knowledge are based, are superior to
clinical judgment for predicting just about anything.
From the results of the third line of research into "clinicians'
judgments," Garb concluded that clinical opinion is probably the last
thing upon which to base court decisions:
The research findings reviewed in this book put severe limitations on
what forensic clinicians can ethically state in a court. First, and
foremost, expert witnesses should not defend their testimony by
6. See PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VS. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954).
7. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ETAL., VIOLENTOFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING
RISK (1998).
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saying that their statements are based on clinical experience. It is
difficult to learn from experience, because accurate feedback is
frequently unavailable and because the cognitive processes of
clinicians are not always optimal. Instead of giving their clinically
based opinions, expert witnesses should inform the court about
relevant research.'
No testimony is more immune from the influences of clinicians'
subjectivity than that concerning the "relevant research." Through the
lens provided by the research, it is abundantly clear that the
psychotherapeutic methodology most helpful to folks can be a disaster
for them when utilized by experts providing information from which
triers will make judicial decisions. The lens also reveals that the
distinctions in job description of clinicians versus experts is now set in
concrete, and the "particular set of rules for achieving certain goals"
quite distinct: in therapy for relieving suffering, and in courts of law "for
describing and explaining phenomena."9
Client-therapist feedback is the sine qua non to efficacious therapy.
On the other hand, in the forensic arena, even if clients do have their say
they will rarely also have the chance to modify or reconsider on second
thought what they already said. Some persons, children for best
example, whose lives will be permanently altered by court decision,
often get no chance whatever to speak for themselves. Even though
clients and their family members will be the ones most effected by the
court's decision, opportunities to reconsider anything are virtually
annihilated when the mallet strikes the block.
Although the lines of research described above were not specifi-
cally related to child custody issues, they are especially pertinent to
them. Accurate feed-back about one's predictions is the sine qua non to
the advancement of knowledge in any field of study. Yet, it is not
possible to obtain accurate feedback for re-organized child custody
arrangements; especially when they are ordered by the court. When
families themselves change custody arrangements they are also free to
change them again, in any way and as often as they please. However,
once implemented, court-ordered changes are not easily alterable,
sometimes not at all and, if at all, only after a showing of "substantial
change of circumstance," which is itself usually a formidable task.
Since the principals' adaptations and assimilations to the arrangements
8. HowARD N. GARB, STUDYING THE CLINICIAN 246 (1998).
9. See BARRY F. ANDERSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE SCIENT1IC METHOD 3-4 (1966).
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modify the environment and, to some extent, everyone in it, fluidity and
cooperation mitigate against the extent to which folks are forced to live
with arrangements they perceive, or are, hurtful or damaging to them.
A court-ordered arrangement, however, is not fluid, and typically
forever precludes meaningful comparison to alternatives that once
existed. Family members each impose their own share of influence into
the paradigm that is any family arrangement, which is especially true of
younger children who are not yet set in virtually any of their perceptions
or ways.
III. SCIENCE, THE LAW, AND PARENTING
Science is not normative. It was, of course, designed precisely not
to be. Hence, science and scientists do not establish values nor the
hierarchy of values. On the other hand, setting norms for people,
establishing values, is precisely what parents, the law, and judges are
required and authorized to do. When parents place the futures of their
families in the hands of the court they receive decisions and orders that
are normative, that is, based fundamentally in values. Except for laws
specifying the limits of courts' authority, court orders are made for
families on the basis of the trial judge's sound discretion about what
should be of value, and the hierarchy of those values, to that family. No
"expert" has similar authority or qualifications. Section 1.04 of the
Ethical Principles of Psychologists, entitled "Boundaries of Compe-
tence," states, "(a) psychologists provide services, teach and conduct
research only within the boundaries of their competence, based on their
education, training, supervised experience, or appropriate professional
experience." The best of education, training, and experience do not
qualify mental health professionals to have competence to know what
is or should be important to other people. "Significance," in which term
science speaks, is not "importance." "Importance" is precisely what
scientists cannot know or decide. No amount of training, education,
talent, or skill, qualify mental health professionals to be norm-makers
for other people. On the other hand, parental prerogative, like the law
and courts, is normative. Only when parents abdicate their responsibil-
ity and right to set norms for themselves and their families do judges
become the ad hoc norm-makers for them. This writer has heard it said
by clinicians that, "We can't let judges make such decisions. They do
10. Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
(1992).
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not understand the dynamic issues." While it might be true that judges
do not always understand the dynamic issues, it is also immaterial
whether they do or not. Judges are precisely the ones designated by the
law of our land, and by the philosophy upon which science is based, to
make such decisions. It is not the task of "experts" to adjudicate cases,
but to provide information about issues brought before the courts for
which "expert" information seems necessary, and is requested and
available. " That means informing the courts about the relevant research
from the expert's field.
Fields of study are not qualified to number themselves amongst the
disciplines of science on the basis of their subject matter, but on the way
in which they study their subject matter. That is, by adopting both the
philosophy of science and its methodology astheir own. The disciplines
of science further removed from the study of physical matter, especially
psychology, are typically filled with competing theoretical ideas about
what causes, or goes with, what. Results of research into the subject
matter vary and are expected to, much of the matter and its significance
in flux. On the other hand, the basic methodology of science is not
significantly alterable. Therefore, subject matter only differentiates one
discipline from another, it does not qualify the discipline to call itself
scientific. Hence, no discipline is science, but can only be of science.
McCormick states:
To warrant the use of expert testimony, then, two elements are
required. First the subject of the inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be
beyond the ken of the average layman, and, second the witness must
have such skill, knowledge or experience in that field or calling as to
make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier
in his search for truth.12
When clinicians accept status as experts in courts of law, they are
obliged to utilize scientific methodology. Specific therapeutic interven-
tions have a myriad of forms, supported by many different underlying
theories and hypotheses. 3 Even when testifying specifically about
therapeutic issues, clinicians must refer to the relevant research, Le., be
expert. Quinsey states, "Ironically, there is evidence that triers (i.e.,
11. See Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings: General
Guidelines: Preparing for a Child Custody Evaluation, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 67 (1994).
12. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 28 (1954).
13. See, e.g., CREATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (Alvin R. Mahrer &
Leonard Pearson eds., 1971 ); HOwARD L. MILLMANETAL., THERAPIESFORADULTS (1982).
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judges) actually want testimony from mental health professionals for
just those legal questions about which mental health professionals are
least expert."' 4
If it is true that clinicians are asked for opinions they are not
qualified to render, then the issues of who are the norm-makers, and the
clinicians' lack of expertise or rights to be norm-makers, are not well
understood by court officers who request such opinions, nor by
clinicians who answer them on the sole basis of their clinical experi-
ence. The subjectivity considered desirable in the therapy room is the
antithesis of the objectivity of the courtroom. Precisely because court
decisions have permanent ramifications for people, the research presents
an indisputable case that something much more scientific, much more
objective and tentative, must take place in courtrooms than it ever needs
take place in private offices. In child custody cases that means
clinicians do not render "expert" opinions about values, ideology,
morality, etc., or about what other people should do with their lives and
families. Not only do other people have to live with the impact upon
their lives of such moralizing, but some are labeled deficient and/or
dangerous by such labeling.
The stark distinction in the ways clinicians think and function,
versus the way scientists do, is reflected in the fact that not too many
years ago the American Psychological Association almost split along
those very lines: clinicians versus researchers and academicians.
However, clinicians who mis-apply methods when they cross over into
the forensic arena come by it honestly. Their clinical opinions are
repeatedly requested and accepted by court officers as if such opinions
had the same accuracy, and the same scientific acceptance, as do the
research and methodology that qualify a field to be numbered amongst
the disciplines of science. In reference to child custody cases, the most
profound misunderstandings appear to be those concerning what
scientists can validly say about parenting and parenting values, and
about the distinction between a value and an issue about which science
might have something to say. In the forensic child custody arena, the
primary issue is "best interests" of other people's children, nothing but
values.
Courts appear to actually seek "clinical opinion," not just accept it,
for which clinicians are not obliged to be tentative or to provide
actuarial or other research data. Experts are allowed to present their
14. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING
RISK 188 (1998).
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conclusions based, instead, on precisely the "clinical opinion" that the
research knows to be quite suspect. In child custody cases the rule that
"expert" witnesses are never to testify to the ultimate legal questions has
been waived by practice; child custody evaluators frequently asked
directly to testify to the ultimate question of specific child custody
arrangements.
It is relatively simple to interpret the court's order "conduct a
psychological evaluation" of a person. Mental health experts can turn
directly to existing tools and standards in their trades for doing so,
coming to rather standard conclusions pointed to by the database.
"Conduct a child custody evaluation," however, has no similar straight
forward interpretation. What specifically is "a child custody evalua-
tion"? Section 11 of the Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in
Divorce Proceedings states, among other things, "The psychologist
strives to use the most appropriate methods available for addressing the
questions raised in a specific child custody evaluation.... ." My focus
is precisely on what those questions might be, and from whence they
come, in any "specific child custody" case. 5 There is by now an
extensive array of instruments thought to be useful in conducting child
custody evaluations. Unless they are applied to specific issues focal to
this family, however, those instruments are a shotgun, significantly
increasing the probability of sampling errors, "chance" interpreted as
"significance."
Scientists, therefore clinicians serving as "experts," validly function
as do travel consultants. The automobile club, AAA, has a map to just
about everywhere, but, they do not tell people where they should go.
Tell an AAA consultant of the destination, then, maps are provided,
usually with more than one route to getting there. In the same way,
mental health experts cannot validly evaluate until they are informed of
the values cherished for this child, for this family. Once mental health
experts are informed of the destinations, so to speak, they are in
positions to turn to their maps, the tools of and the information from
their trades, in suggesting various ways to get there. Few clinicians
would consider establishing values for clients who present at their
offices. Certainly travelers would be quite taken aback if informed that
the consultant will be the one to decide where the travelers are going.
Travelers, parents, courts, or a guardian ad litem, are the only ones
sometimes qualified to decide destinations for other people.
15. Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings: General
Guidelines: Preparing for a Child Custody Evaluation, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 67 (1994).
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Evaluators who comply when asked to make specific recommenda-
tions when their instructions are no more than "conduct a child custody
evaluation and make recommendations for custody" abandon the very
objectivity that qualifies them as "experts," just as they do when they
themselves specify the "best interests" of other people's children. In
doing either the mental health expert usurps the sacred prerogatives that
lie solely within the province of legitimate, qualified norm makers.
Parents and court officers who request such opinions appear to assume
that clinicians have the requisite qualifications and knowledge to render
them. They come by the assumption honestly when clinicians accept
such charges, thereby implying that they have knowledge they cannot
possibly have.
When child custody conflicts reach the stage at which appointment
of mental health evaluators is necessary, it is extremely unlikely that
both parents or their attorneys will agree with the evaluator's findings;
no matter who initially chose the issues that were to be focal to the
evaluation, no matter how sincere they were when asking the experts for
custody recommendations. To the contrary, heated disagreement is the
norm. For one thing, conflict over which parent is to blame for breaking
up the family quickly metastasizes into the rest of the family. When the
conflict threatens the parents' relationships with their children, blame
rapidly becomes contagious to interventionists. For another, everyone's
parental values are as good as anyone else's and, in a democracy, there
is no legitimate argument to the contrary. For still another, attorneys,
who are legally and ethically mandated to serve only their clients, will
sometimes be the first to raise dissent to the evaluator's methods and
conclusions. Attorneys are formidable allies in justifying the parents'
views of reality, of what constitutes the "best interests" of the children,
and of their client's abilities to best provide for those interests. Even if
parents and attorneys initially claimed to be unable to identify what
constituted "best interests," rest assured that one side, at least, will be
convinced that whatever the evaluator chose was absolutely wrong.
Weiss, speaking from a broader point of view, presents an
extremely cogent argument for why clinicians must be very tenuous
about their conclusions when serving as experts in courts of law:
Moreover, social science does not provide certainties. It gives
probabilistic conclusions that are time- and place-bound, provisional,
and subject to revision. It [social science research] tends not to
simplify problems and converge on a single solution, but to provide
a wide range of findings-some discrepant, some in outright conflict.
As research continues over time, it tends to yield a complex and
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multifaceted view of reality. This may well be a realistic representa-
tion of a complex world, but it hardly simplifies the lot of decision-
makers looking for an "answer." Moreover, social science evidence
is based upon events in the past, and extrapolations to the future are
always problematic. In all these senses, it fails to satisfy
policymakers' yearning for easy solutions.'6
Science and the law can work extremely well together, like partners
in a good union. However, just as in a good union, they can not do so
when the division of labor is not agreed-upon, respected, preserved, and
nurtured. Failure to engage a mutually agreed-upon division of labor
typically results in conflict, eroding many gratifications to be had in a
union. Similarly, failure to keep the job descriptions of science, on the
one hand, and the law, on the other, distinct and separate, results in
conflict, confusion, and distrust, instead of harmonious relationships.
The closer the mental health evaluators' premises and conclusions
are to reflections of value, the easier and more appropriate it is for others
to take rightful issue with their so-called "expert" opinions. Mental
health professionals wade into treacherous waters when they render
opinions about what constitutes the "best interests" of other people's
children, and/or make specific recommendations about child custody on
the basis of their own values instead of the values of those having the
authority to specify value. Stakes are so high in child custody cases that
even experts who rigidly adhere to the methods of science in their
processes and in drawing their conclusions are sometimes subject to
vicious attacks upon their credibility and reputations by those who do
not like their conclusions. When under such siege, experts who do not
confine their interventions to the role of scientist are left without their
most formidable ally. They are left to explain, among other things, how
their conclusions are not just speculation, and how they were not
pivotally influenced by their own subjectivity. The way the research has
shaped up, the standard of practice in the forensic arena is now quite
distinct from what it is in one's office.
16. Carol Weiss, The Diffusion of Social Science Research to Policymakers: An
Overview, in REFORMING THE LAW; IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 72 (Gary B.
Melton ed., 1987) (citations omitted).
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IV. FOCAL ISSUES: GROUNDING THE EVALUATION IN SCIENTIFIC
OBJECTIVITY
"Comprehensive" in "The Comprehensive Child Custody Evalua-
tion" refers to the comprehensiveness with which the evaluation is
structured, and the focal issues selected and addressed. It does not mean
that every conceivable issue one could imagine about parenting and/or
children will be investigated. Having variables specified in advance of
examining them is not novel in science. All objective research begins
that way. And, save child custody cases, it is exactly what occurs and
is expected to occur in the forensic arena. In child custody cases,
however, directions such as "conduct a child custody evaluation and
make recommendations for custody" are the rule rather than the
exception, as if there actually were such a thing as "a child custody
evaluation," that everyone sees it the same way, and that it would
actually indicate the best possible specific custody arrangements.
Legal descriptions of "best interests" are broad, and can often be
addressed without the services of mental health experts: "health, safety,
and welfare of the child;" "the nature and amount of contact with both
parents;" "stable custody arrangements;" "an end to litigation;"
"preserving the child's established mode of living;" "nature and amount
of time with both parents;" "no change in custody," etc. Typically,
parents who are thought to have been physically abusive to the children
and/or to the other parent, and those who show evidence of interfering
with the relationship between the children and the other parent, are
considered less able to provide for whatever the other best interests are
thought to be. For all but the most clear-cut of those definitions there
are numerous competing interpretations. Except for laws proscribing
certain ways of handling children, and those specifying to what children
are entitled, what constitutes psychological and emotional "health,
safety and welfare of the child" is subject of considerable controversy.
In every family, intact or splintered, there are substantial differences of
opinion as to what provides for those. Everybody, including the
children themselves, have their own separate versions. In disputed child
custody cases that difference of opinion is heatedly emphasized.
Family issues, like legal concepts, cannot be answered directly with
information from the field of mental health. Everything about families
and custody arrangements is relative. Therefore, experts are required to
operationalize language into specific factors that can be legitimately
examined using scientific methodology. How is "nature" in "nature and
amount of contact" to be defined? What is the optimal balance between
2000]
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quantity and quality, and how is "quality" defined? At a more basic
level, science has never declared itself to know what is in anyone's best
interests. And, no one has ever shown that they know what is in the
ultimate best interests of anyone, including themselves. Nowhere is
there evidence to support the notion that the ultimate quality of one's
life is determined by the kinds of parenting or parents, or family
arrangements, they had. This writer has often mused on what an
evaluator's focus and opinions would be in a custody case with, for
example, the Mozarts, or for Helen Keller.
In its "Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce
Proceedings," the American Psychological Association states, "The goal
of the guidelines is to promote proficiency in using psychological
expertise in conducting child custody evaluations."' 7 However, mental
health professionals have no proficiency to specify what constitutes
"best interests" of other people's children. Rather, "expert" proficiency
can not begin until "best interests" are determined by those actually
authorized and qualified to define them. When it comes right down to
it, that means virtually anyone except the expert who will conduct the
evaluation. Once the focal issues are specified, the evaluator might be
able to provide information that might be helpful to parents and triers in
deciding about them. Evaluators who take on the prerogatives of
parents and the courts do not function as the helpers and scientists they
are supposed to be, but as social engineers, attempting whether they
know it or not to build society according to their own currently-held
images. It is this author's contention that mental health professionals
are not qualified in any way, nor authorized by anything, to determine
what issues are the important ones from amongst the many that surround
families, nor are they qualified to decide what custody arrangements
will maximize quality of life for the family members, or, to even know
what constitutes that quality.
Courts must reach decisions based on evidence that makes its way
into the record. Therefore, testimony from evaluators about specific
recommendations based in the evaluator's subjective opinion of what
constitutes "best interests," or made without referring to best interests
as defined by others, provides evidence that is incomplete, even
distorted, because it is not derived scientifically and is highly subject to
bias. On the other hand, propositional recommendations based on
assessment of focal issues specified by others for the evaluator, can
17. Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings: General
Guidelines: Preparing for a Child Custody Evaluation, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 67 (1994).
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provide triers with a wide range of cogent, objective evidence as each
conclusion is tied to the specified issues and the data pointing there. For
example, say the following two issues are specified: "emotional
attachment patterns" of the child, and "the stability of each parent's
personality and attitudes" as measured by, for example, the "Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory" and the "Sixteen Personality
Factors," and their track records of residential and interpersonal
permanence, and lack of arrest record. Say also that the mental health
expert interprets the database as meaning that the child exhibits a high
degree of positive emotional attachment to father, and that father's
psychological profile suggests that he is not all that reliable or consistent
in terms of taking care of everyday stuff. To the contrary, father
describes himself, and tests, as more laissez faire, adventurous, and
somewhat impulsive. Father believes that "kids are better at fending for
themselves than most adults realize," hence, gives the child wide
latitude to explore surroundings without direct adult intervention.
Mother, on the other hand, to whom the child is also positively
emotionally attached but to what appears to be a significantly lesser
degree than the child is to father, has a psychological profile suggesting
that she is rather compulsive, highly practical, consistent and organized.
She takes care of every day business in some detail. She is not nearly
as adventurous as father, is more staid and conventional than father, and
she believes that children must be well supervised and directed. Both
mother and father describe themselves in precisely those very ways, and
they have track records that fit hand-in-glove with other data suggesting
those attributes. At the same time, they are both free of any hints of
psychopathology, and both appear psychologically and emotionally
stable, neither expressing any more distress or emotional turmoil than
would be expected of folks undergoing such hurtful and threatening
experiences. How can any mental health professional legitimately
decide for that child and those parents which of the parents represents
the best full-time placement for that child, or how that arrangement
should be constructed? How can a mental health professional legiti-
mately decide whether the attachment pattern or the practical consis-
tency is of best interests to this child?
Propositions, on the other hand, are what scientists are qualified to
offer. The expert's report to the court should discuss precisely those
findings. The expert should inform that "this is what the data has to say
about the attachment patterns of this child," and "this is what the data
has to say about personality stability of the parents." If any recommen-
dation for custody arrangement were made in this case it would be
2000] 493
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phrased something like: "If the attachment patterns are considered the
more important for this child, then, the data supports the idea of
placement with the father. If the judge considers it more important for
the child to reside in a more conventional home, which provides more,
and more regular, hands-on supervision, in which the child has more
limitations imposed upon his movement, then, the data supports the idea
that the mother is the placement of choice." When examining the
issues, evaluators are advised to apply to their thinking what Saks calls
the "litmus test" for experts: "Tell me about all the missing pieces, all the
defects, all the weaknesses in the testimony you have given so far,; tell me
everything you know that would be helpful to my client's case."'8 Experts are
much closer to passing that test, before they ever reach the witness
stand, when they remain scientifically objective, refer to and cite the
relevant research, and provide tentative, propositional opinions and
recommendations linked to focal issues selected for them by those
qualified and authorized to select them.
This author is often met with disfavor when he declares his lack of
expertise for determining "best interests," his need to have those values
defined by someone other than the author himself, and when he informs
that he will provide his recommendations in the form of propositions
tied to those focal issues. Complaints are often that the clients cannot
financially afford it, which is, of course, reality-based. Offering
propositional custody recommendations, rather than recommending one
specific arrangement, raises costs because they typically provide
something favorable to both sides, while a specific recommendation
usually gives one side little to go on; splitting even more into "good
parent"-"bad parent." Money is often saved because a parent and
attorney are less likely to push for trial when they believe their side is
already lost because of the evaluator's specific recommendation.
Nonetheless, making propositional recommendations that are tied to
issues selected for the expert by others is the scientific way to do it. It
places the responsibility for choosing the destinations (values) and the
roads for getting there (the alternative arrangements) solidly where it
legitimately belongs, with the parents and, in their failure to agree, with
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Every professional involved in child custody cases has long since
developed empathy for the way divorce and custody battles debilitate
18. Michael Saks, Opportunities Lost: The Theory and the Practice of Using
Developmental Knowledge in the Adversary Trial, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 187 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987).
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people and finances. Regardless of how reasonable the complaints may
be, however, they do not thereby provide "experts" with skills and
authority they cannot have. Hence, the choice is rather simple: either
objectively specify "best interests" to begin with or there can be no
"expert" evaluation by a mental health professional, and either present
recommendations as proposition or there are no "expert" opinions. On
the other hand, having precise issues upon which the evaluation is to
focus can be economical. It can preclude the expense of evaluators
checking everything, speaking to everybody, reading everything, and
testing for everything, in the hope of finding some kind of information
pointing in one direction or the other, by chance if nothing else.
Disgruntled parents and their attorneys are extremely adept at attempt-
ing to discredit experts by pointing out how the experts did not do an
adequate job. Therefore, when financial limitations are described
beforehand, it is necessary to have even more than the focal issues
specified in advance.
None of this is new. In science only exploratory research legiti-
mately begins with the researchers themselves subjectively choosing the
variables they will then examine. At its most informative, results of
exploratory research suggest directions for additional, and more
controlled, research. In controlled research, the stuff from which
scientific knowledge is thought to arise, the variables are objectively
selected by other than those doing the research, and/or by the flags
raised in previous research. A moment's reflection on the persuasive
influence of social, political, emotional, religious, moral and financial
pressures informs that objectivity in research or in evaluations cannot
exit without such controls. Every court-ordered custody arrangement is
necessarily an experiment for which there can be no meaningful feed-
back. Because decisions must be made about custody arrangements
does not mean the judge's decision will actually prove to be the best of
the options available just before the decision was made. There will
never be an opportunity to assess what would have happened under any
of the alternative arrangements whose roads were open until the
decision was made. Everyone, perhaps especially children, appear to
have an instinct to foster their own view of things and the environment,
and in doing so alter to some extent everyone in their families. As the
Existentialists say, the nature of human consciousness is that it believes
anything it wants to believe; folks believe precisely what they perceive
as being good for them to believe at any given moment. Every person
will accommodate and assimilate, therefore modify any arrangement in
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which they are placed. Implementation of any arrangement necessarily
influences and shapes the dynamics of any subsequent arrangement.
Child custody arrangements are therefore an experiment that is
absent the controls and feed-back available in scientific research. Once
the family sets foot on one road all others vanish. There will never be
subsequent opportunity to go back and try the roads not traveled because
everyone and the roads are in some ways changed irreversibly by the
first step on the road taken. That is why, if for no other reason, those
who must live with the arrangements should decide upon them. And,
not being able to decide on them must, at least, have the opportunity to
give their versions of what is important to them and to their families,
from which the judge can make a decision.
V. SELECTING FOCAL ISSUES
A valid strategy for objectively selecting focal issues sets out the
means for selecting them before the evaluative process begins: i.e., the
trial judge specifies them; the parents select them; the attorneys specify
them and the parents concur; if the parents and their attorneys cannot or
will not agree on the focal issues, then the guardian ad litem or the
child's attorney can specify them; the parents can each specify their
versions and the evaluator explores both. The court's order, or
instructions from the parents and the attorneys can, when certain
conditions are met, place the task of selecting the focal issues at the
discretion of the evaluator. The "certain conditions" are met prior to
actually selecting the focal factors: the evaluator informs the principals
that when evaluators choose the focus of their evaluations they
necessarily introduce their subjectivity into that process and, even when
they consult the research, might address issues that are of importance to
the evaluator but not necessarily to the parents, the attorneys or the court
(i.e., estimating fitness of a broad child developmental need to this child
can be extremely difficult). The evaluator explains that textbooks do
not contain information that directly transform parental values, interests,
goals, or legal language into specific focal issues or psychological
correlates. That, in the absence of direction from those authorized to
provide it, the scientific thing to do is for the evaluator to conduct
exploratory interviews and analyses, then return to the parents and
attorneys with the evaluator's ideas of what the "best interests" might
be. The parents and/or the attorneys can then choose from amongst
them, can modify them and/or, having heard those, specify their own.
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"Alternative dispute resolution" strategies are a promising source
for pin-pointing the crucial issues in a family. Through general divorce
education and, if necessary, through strategic education and/or counsel-
ing, many parents will themselves decide upon or recognize those
issues. If the focal issues are not clarified through the end of the general
and specialized education and/or counseling, then, mediation that fails
to reconcile the differences may well point to them. 9 When all else fails
to yield direction from those with authority to give that direction, obtain
from the parents their complaints and compliments, their versions of
various potential arrangements, and what each foresees as likely positive
and negative consequences of the alternatives they described. On the
whole, parents disclose their values in their complaints and compliments
toward each other. The evaluator may infer from those descriptions
what might best address the parents' values and goals and the children's
needs. Then, before starting the evaluative process, obtain agreement
from the parents and their attorneys (and guardian ad litem or child's
attorney) concerning those suggestions.
Ten years ago it was this author's opinion that he should also obtain
the court's agreement. However, it has become obvious that courts
themselves rarely specify the content of the arguments the courts will
hear, leaving it to the attorneys to present their versions of the issues.
If the author still does not obtain agreement on the focal issues in that
way, he asks permission from the parents and attorneys to choose them
from the body of information existing in the professional literature.2
The evaluation begins only when the parents agree to the focal issues.
However, the evaluator informs that even after an objective evaluation
of the variables and his interpretation of their interrelationships, he
cannot be said to have actually provided information that guarantees the
"best interests" of the children have been addressed, and that ultimately,
if they fail to agree on custody, it will be the trial court who estimates
and predicts best interests from all the information presented to the
court.
19. See Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From
Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LiTrLE ROCK
L. REV. 393 (2000); see also Janet Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional
Partnerships with the Court on BehalfoffHigh-Conflict Divorcing Families and Their Children:
Who Needs What Kind of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 451 (2000).
20. See Robert Halon, Child Custody "Move Away" Cases: McGinnis and Psychology,
12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 43-54 (1994). See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Dr. Judith
S. Wallerstein, Ph.D, Burgess v. Burgess, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Nos. F02050, F021744)
(Cal. Ct. App., 5th Cir. 1995).
2000] 497
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Regardless of how the focal issues are chosen, there remain three
additional tasks to complete before the evaluation begins: (1) translate
common and legal language within which focal issues are stated into
professional language of best fit; (2) estimate the extent to which each
of the cited focal factors can be legitimately investigated using the tools
of the mental health trades; then (3) inform the parents, the attorneys,
and/or the court as to the limits of the evaluators' (the professional
literature's) ability to directly answer the questions posed by those
issues. In his original paper, this author described a lengthy "Terms,
Conditions, and Agreements for Custody Evaluations." However, a
highly seasoned trial judge soon informed that the evaluator was not free
to form a contract with anyone else since the evaluator's contract was
already with the judge appointing him to the case. The author,
therefore, no longer creates contracts with the clients in court-ordered
cases, but still obtains their "informed consent." He also does not
perform child custody evaluations that he is not ordered by the court to
perform.
VI. GENERAL GUIDELINES
When accepting appointment as an expert to conduct a child
custody evaluation establish and maintain rigid neutrality. Unless there
are clear contraindications to doing so (i.e., one or both parents appear
extremely emotionally fragile; one parent is in dread of the other; the
parents are unable to control themselves in each other's presence, etc.)
hold the initial session conjointly with both parents and, unless the
attorneys specifically inform that they do not desire to attend, with them
as well. At that first session seek from the parents (and attorneys) their
versions of the focal issues, explain the limits of professional abilities
then, obtain their agreement on both the focal issues and the scope of the
evaluation. If the court's order, or the guardian ad litem for the child,
specified the focal issues, explain those to the parents and attorneys so
that they will have the opportunity to decide whether or not they want
to participate in an evaluation with that scope and focus.
Experts do not appear mandated to conduct evaluations if the
parents do not wish to participate. It is this author's habit to not ask
"why" when a parent declines to participate but to merely inform the
court and the attorneys, and to beg the court's guidance. If the court
then specifically orders the evaluator to conduct the evaluation, the
evaluator notifies the parents and their attorneys that the order will be
obeyed unless the evaluator believes that he might not be able to remain
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objective in face of the parent(s) disinclination to willingly participate.
It is up to the attorneys to deal with the court and their clients about
such issues..
Strongly encourage parents to agree and decide themselves on the
custody of their children. Explain the foreseeable pitfalls of having
strangers involved in the process making such profound decisions
concerning their futures. If not precluded by court order, or prior
directives, provide a forum for agreement to be reached between the
parents themselves. Before submitting final conclusions, and unless
there is stark evidence that one of the parents is not fit to parent the
child, the evaluator strives to have the parents themselves decide upon
the future custody of the child.
Hold no ex parte contacts with the attorneys. The only exception
to the rule being that the author will speak to the child's guardian ad
litem (or attorney) when he is unable to obtain agreement from parents
and attorneys about an important factor involved in the evaluation.
However, it is stated at the outset that the examiner will speak to the
guardian ad litem under those conditions. Information supplied to the
examiner during the evaluation is in writing, which attorneys courtesy-
copy to each other. Except under conditions warranting mandatory
reporting, everything that the evaluator has to say about the case is said
to all the attorneys and both parents at the same time unless made
impossible by the participants. Sometimes attorney and parent decline
to participate or are unable to do so. When that happens they can
authorize the examiner to speak with the others without them.
Publicize as little information about the parents' "psychological
profiles" and histories as is necessary to support the evaluator's
conclusions. Information about these are fertile fields for the growth of
additional emotional concerns and stress, and of self-righteousjustifica-
tions between fault-finding parents trying to gain the upper hand or keep
their own head above water. Parents are informed that psychological
test results will be provided to qualified professionals designated by the
parents to receive them. Sometimes an attorney on one side will insist
that she/he wants this author to explain the test results to the client.
When that happens this author informs the other side of the request, and
obtains their permission for the author to meet with the other parent
before doing so.
Explain to parents and attorneys the negative impact written reports
can have; i.e., publicize their personal lives. Explain to parents that,
while the evaluator desires to protect their privacy as much as is
possible, a written report requires that the evaluator fully support the
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choice of focus, every conclusion, and the recommendations. This may
often mean writing information in a document that will become a public
record and might be discussed in open court; information that parents
might have preferred was not made known to others. All evaluator
reports, verbal or written, are provided to both sides at the same time.
Hold no case preparation nor consult with only one side unless the
other specifically states that they do not want to participate and the
examiner considers a preparation with less than full complement of
parents and attorneys vital for protecting the children. Attorneys
representing the parent who seems favored by the evaluator's report will
often want to confer with the evaluator in preparing the case for trial.
They will also seem to have a very understanding and supportive ear for
the evaluator's insightful recommendations. Don't do it. Remain
absolutely neutral. Do nothing whatever that anyone could perceive as
biased. Even when arriving at the courthouse hold conferences only
with both attorneys present. Strive to not take comfort from the praise
of parents and atto'rneys, nor umbrage at their attacks, as difficult an
intrapsychic maneuver as that can be. Indulging either erodes objectiv-
ity. Rigidly resist any invitation to align with anything but the data.
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